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SESSION 2 - I

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: KEY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN 2014—PART I: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEW EUROPEAN
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES
Christopher R. Yukins
Lynn David Research Professor in Government Procurement Law
Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program
The George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This past year saw major developments in European public procurement law, as a number of new
procurement directives, discussed in draft form last year, see Christopher R. Yukins, The New European
Procurement Directives: A Critical Perspective, 2014 Gov. Con. Year Rev. Briefs 3 (Feb. 2014), finally came
into force. This paper will focus on the two elements of the new European Union procurement directive, 2014/24/EU, most likely to affect the U.S. procurement community: new flexibility in the use of
best-value negotiations, and expanded grounds for excluding potential contractors. The paper also will
discuss how the new directive may affect ongoing trade negotiations regarding procurement markets.
II.

POINTS OF CONVERGENCE IN THE NEW EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES

The new European procurement directives came into force on April 17, 2014. Each European
member state now has two years to implement the new directives into their own laws. See, e.g., UK
Cabinet Office, Guidance: Transposing EU Procurement Directives (updated Oct. 6, 2014), available
at https://www.gov.uk/transposing-eu-procurement-directives. The new directives govern procurement at all levels of government across Europe (what we would consider national, state and local
governments in the United States). See, e.g., Pedro Telles, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The
EU’s Internal Market, Public Procurement Thresholds, and Cross-Border Interest, 43 Pub. Cont.
L.J. 3 (2013) (discussing role of directives); Sue Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC
Procurement Law: From Framework to Common Code?, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 337 (2006). See generally
Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, Vol. 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2014).
While there are several new European procurement directives -- including directives on concessions, see, e.g., Richard Craven, The EU’s 2014 Concessions Directive, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 188
(available on Westlaw); Michael Burnett, The New European Directive on the Award of Concession Contracts - Promoting Value for Money in PPP Contracts?, 9 EPPPL 86 (2014) (available on
Westlaw), and utilities, see, e.g., Totis Kotsonis, The 2014 Utilities Directive of the EU: Codification,
Flexibilisation and Other Misdemeanours, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 169 -- the focus here will be on
the core public procurement directive, covering purchases of goods and services by procuring entities across Europe, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65. Although this new directive is
not intended to address defense procurement, under Article 15 it does sweep up those defense- and
security-related purchases not covered by the European directive specifically directed to defense
procurement, Directive 2009/81/EC. See generally Christopher R. Yukins, supra, 2014 Gov. Con.
Year Rev. Briefs 3 (discussing scope of draft directive); Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment:
The European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective, 51 GC ¶ 383 (Nov. 4, 2009).
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For the U.S. procurement community, the new directive, which covers
many different aspects of procurement, from planning to bidding to award,
is vitally important for a number of reasons. First, although the discussion below is necessarily limited by space, a review of the directive’s many
provisions clearly shows that European procurement law is increasingly
similar to U.S. procurement law. Experienced contracting professionals
from the United States will be able to use these similarities to their advantage, for the more the procedures converge, the easier it is for market
participants to move from one market to the other. Second, however, in
some ways the European directive is strikingly different from U.S. laws,
and these differences create competitive traps for outsiders, some of which
are touched on below. Third, understanding where the most serious traps
lie -- where divergence creates serious competitive barriers to procurement markets -- may help frame how the United States should approach
its trade negotiations with Europe, and with other regions and nations
following the same lines of convergence, for those negotiations provide an
ongoing and important opportunity for harmonization.
A. European Union’s Embrace of Flexible Negotiations
For U.S. exporters, perhaps the most important development under the
new directive is the European Union’s embrace of flexible negotiations as
a procurement method, much as flexible competitive negotiation methods
have been widely adopted in the federal government. See Christopher R.
Yukins, supra, 2014 Gov. Con. Year Rev. Briefs 3. Of the competitive procedures available under federal rules, see, e.g., Kate M. Manuel, Competition in Federal Contracting: An Overview of the Legal Requirements 8-9
(Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. R40516, June 30, 2011), available at https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40516.pdf, multilateral competitive negotiations under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15, 48 C.F.R. Part
15, are by far the most commonly used method for complex procurements
(information technology and weapons systems, for example). As the discussion below reflects, these developments in European Union procurement
policy may open new opportunities for the U.S. export community, and
more broadly may suggest new ways of thinking about more flexible approaches to public procurement.
1. Importance of Best-Value Negotiations to High
Technology Exporters
For some time, high-technology firms have recognized that they may
not be able to compete effectively in world procurement markets if buyers
are locked into “sealed bidding” procurement methods (which are sometimes called “open tendering” methods in foreign procurement systems).
See, e.g., Defense Acquisition University, Acquipedia -- Sealed Bidding
Procedures (narrative discussion of sealed bidding process under FAR
Part 14), available at https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.
aspx?aid=da800e14-bf23-44fc-892c-6f5b26dc0363. Open tendering (sealed
bidding) methods typically emphasize price, and quality is typically set by
the government’s previously fixed specifications, against which bidders
often must compete on price alone. In a bidding environment of this kind,
high-value, high-price products and services built on the latest technology
© 2015 Thomson Reuters
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will typically lose; the low-priced bidder, offering a technically compliant
but perhaps mediocre product or service, will nearly always win.
2. Comparative U.S. Federal Trend: LPTA Procurements
Within U.S. federal procurement, the tensions between sealed bidding
and competitive negotiations have played out, in recent years, in an ongoing controversy over the use of the “Lowest Price-Technically Acceptable”
(LPTA) method. See generally Vernon J. Edwards, Lowest Price Technically
Acceptable Source Selection: When and How Should Agencies Use It?, 26
Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 62 (Nov. 2012). While the LPTA method is technically a form of competitive negotiation under FAR Part 15 (and exchanges
are permitted during the procedure, per FAR 15.101-2), in practice the
LPTA method often is not materially different from sealed bidding: offerors propose against technical requirements set by the agency, and the
lowest-priced technically acceptable offer typically wins. Under the LPTA
approach, there is no best-value tradeoff between price and quality. FAR
15.101-2(b)(2).
In part because of growing budgetary pressures, federal agencies
have resorted more to the LPTA method, see, e.g., Timothy Bunting, Lost
and Found: In Search of A Uniform Approach for Selecting Best Value, 44
Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2014), despite strong criticism from industry, see, e.g.,
Vernon J. Edwards, supra (discussing industry criticism), and concerns
from Congress, see, e.g., Robert Nichols & Jad C. Totman, Feature Comment: Myth-Busting the LPTA Conundrum, 55 GC ¶ 392 (Dec. 18, 2013)
(discussing congressional concerns); House Rep. No. 113-102, 113th Cong.,
1st Sess. 185-86 (June 7, 2013) (House Armed Services Committee noted
that it was concerned that “careful consideration must be given to each
contract . . . [W]hen the requirement is complex, performance risk is high,
or failure to perform has significant consequences . . . then a best-value
tradeoff approach may be more appropriate”); see also GAO Report No.
GAO-14-584 (July 2014) (study of use of best value procurements); DOD’s
Best-Value Processes Consistent With Guidance, GAO Says, 56 GC ¶ 264
(Aug. 13, 2014).
Nor, it seems, are federal agencies using the LPTA method solely to
drive down costs; as one federal acquisition official noted, quite bluntly,
the LPTA method may be favored because it reduces potential criticism
and accountability of federal officials. See Sean Lyngaas, DHS’s Borkowski:
Acquisition Officials Must Get Tougher with Industry, Federal Computer
Week, Aug. 6, 2014 (senior acquisition official noted: “You want to know
why we do LPTA [lowest price, technically acceptable]? Because it’s safer.
The idea in government, what we are all trained by history to do, is avoid
consequences.”), available at http://fcw.com/articles/2014/08/06/borkowskigets-tough-on-acquisition.aspx; see also Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests:
The Costs Are Real, but the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42 Pub. Cont. L.J.
489, 506 (2013) (“Contracting Officers have told the author that they are
acting to avoid bid protests when they decide that a contract should be
awarded to the lowest-priced, technically acceptable (LPTA) proposal,
rather than to allow for a trade-off.”).
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3. World Bank Endorses Best-Value Negotiations
While U.S. federal agencies have turned to the LPTA method -- which
some might say is turning back the clock to a time, several decades ago,
when awards based on low price alone were more common in federal procurement -- the World Bank has signaled that it will take the opposite
approach, and endorse a broader use of negotiations and best-value awards
in Bank-financed projects. See generally Jeffrey Gutman, World Bank
Evaluation Group Issues Procurement Review: Do the Conclusions Fit the
Analysis, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/23world-bank-procurement-gutman (Dec. 23, 2013) (discussing background
to current round of World Bank procurement reforms). This is a change in
World Bank practice, and, because of the large role that the World Bank
plays in the developing world, the new policy marks an important new
direction. The report on consultations regarding proposed reforms to the
Bank’s procurement policies stated, for example:
A point made frequently in the external consultations was
that the Bank’s procedures allow for awarding contracts on
the basis of the lowest price alone. This is not the case. The
Bank’s Procurement Guidelines allow considerable latitude
to include factors other than price, such as quality and aftersales service. However, in applying the policy, Bank staff and
counterparts often choose the lowest evaluated bid based on price
alone, perhaps because it is less complicated to do or is perceived
to be less risky. It may also conform to local practices and
procurement rules that require decisions to be made on the basis
of the lowest price. A further contributing factor may be that
economy is commonly understood as “the least expensive good,”
“something not extravagant,” “which avoids unnecessary waste,”
“the careful, thrifty, frugal, and prudent management of money,”
and “restraint.” While positive attributes, these definitions are
insufficient to accommodate modern concepts of sustainability,
quality, and whole-life costs that underpin value for money.

World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Finance Phase I: A Proposed New Framework 4 (Oct. 2013) (emphasis added),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT/Resources/ProcurementProposedNewFrameworkOctober2013Final.pdf. In
undertaking these reforms, the Bank has specifically cited the need to
embrace “[m]odern procurement methods such as competitive dialogue,
negotiation, [and] best and final offer.” World Bank, Procurement in World
Bank Investment Project Finance -- Phase II: Developing the Proposed
New Procurement Framework, Framework Paper for Consultation 7 (July
8, 2014), available at http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/
procurement-policy-review-consultations.
4. New European Directive Opens Door to Broader Use
of Negotiations for Best-Value Awards
Now the European Union has offered its own renewed support for bestvalue-based multilateral negotiations, for reasons both predictable and
© 2015 Thomson Reuters
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surprising. The new directive specifically allows the use of “competitive
dialogue” (carried over from the prior directive, 2004/18/EU) and “competitive procedure with negotiation” (a new procedure). See Jonathan Davey,
Procedures Involving Negotiation in the New Public Procurement Directive:
Key Reforms to the Grounds for Use and the Procedural Rules, 2014 Pub.
Proc. L. Rev. 103; Christopher R. Yukins, supra, 2014 Gov. Con. Year Rev.
Briefs 3 (discussing two methods in detail). The new directive also places
renewed emphasis on the use of best-value awards, where appropriate.
See Paula Bordalo Faustino, Award Criteria in the New EU Directive on
Public Procurement, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 124.
While U.S. rules do not set a preference between sealed bidding and
competitive negotiations, see FAR 6.401, traditionally the European Union
directives had strongly favored open tendering (as noted, akin to U.S.
sealed bidding). The recitals to the new directive, however, now endorse
the use of more flexible negotiations:
There is a great need for contracting authorities to have
additional flexibility to choose a procurement procedure, which
provides for negotiations. A greater use of those procedures is
also likely to increase cross-border trade, as the evaluation
has shown that contracts awarded by negotiated procedure
with prior publication have a particularly high success rate of
cross-border tenders. Member states should be able to provide
for the use of competitive procedure with negotiation or the
competitive dialogue, in various situations where open or
restricted procedures without negotiations are not likely to lead
to satisfactory procurement outcomes. It should be recalled that
use of the competitive dialogue has significantly increased in
terms of contract values over the past years. It has shown itself
to be of use in cases where contracting authorities are unable to
define the means of satisfying their needs or of assessing what
the market can offer in terms of technical, financial or legal
solutions. This situation may arise may arise in particular with
innovative projects, the implementation of major integrated
transport infrastructure projects, large computer networks or
projects involving complex and structured financing.

Directive 2014/24/EU, Recital 42 (emphasis added). Although this recital
to the public procurement directive is not legally binding, see, e.g., Michael
Koeding, Active Transposition of EU Legislation, EIPASCOPE 2007/3, at 29
(“recitals are not legally binding, but intend to help civil servants in Member States to interpret the purpose of the directive’s provisions”), available
at http://aei.pitt.edu/11064/1/20080313162050_MKA_SCOPE2007-3_Internet-4.pdf, this recital does raise two important points.
•

The recital’s italicized language points to recent European research which indicates that competitive dialogue
and other forms of negotiation resulted in more crossborder procurement -- significantly more than the average
share of procurement, 1.4%, which is traditionally done across
borders in the European Union. See Figure 1, infra; Zornitsa
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Kutlina-Dimitrova & Csilla Lakato, Determinants of Direct
Cross-Border Public Procurement in EU Member States, at
page 7 & Fig. 5 (European Commission Chief Economist Note,
July 2014) (“compared to the average in EU Member States
of 1.4%, other types of procedures such as the ones awarded
through competitive dialogue, negotiated with competition and
accelerated negotiated procedures are found to be significantly
above the average in terms of number of contracts awarded
to foreigners[, and] [i]n terms of value, the same patter[n]s
are revealed”), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2014/july/tradoc_152700.pdf.
•

The recital gives examples of procurements, such as for
“large computer networks” or “projects involving complex and
structured financing,” which are well-suited to competitive
dialogue or a competitive procedure with negotiation.
While these examples are not binding or exclusive, see, e.g.,
Jonathan Davey, supra, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. at 106-07, the
examples could prove extremely persuasive if firms, involved
in the cited types of procurements, hope to convince procuring
authorities that they should use these more flexible methods.
See also Directive 2014/24/EU, Art. 26(4) (discussing conditions
for use of two methods).
5. European Data Offer New Perspective on
Negotiations’ Benefits

The first point cited above, regarding new European data on crossborder procurement which was endorsed by the directive, bears special emphasis, because that data may reshape the debate regarding multilateral
competitive negotiations. For years, that debate has focused on the benefits
of flexible negotiations to the buyer -- observers have argued that methods
such as competitive dialogue give buyers badly needed new flexibility in
procurement. See, e.g., European Commission, Public Procurement Reform
-- Factsheet No. 3: Simplifying the Rules for Contracting Authorities, at 1,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/
modernising_rules/reform_proposals/index_en.htm.
The new European data offer, in contrast, a completely new perspective: that cross-border trade may be boosted by a more flexible
approach to procurement, using negotiations. This, in turn, suggests
that more flexible negotiation procedures may be good for suppliers, for
suppliers may be willing to risk more in cross-border procurements if
the procedures are more flexible, based on more open exchanges regarding best-value solutions for the purchasing agency. This point -- that
negotiated-best-value methods may be better for suppliers, too, because
the more flexible methods reduce risk and accommodate vendors’ new
sources of value -- echoes U.S. industry’s opposition to price-based
(LPTA-type) procurements in the federal government (discussed above),
though the European data seem to lend new support, from a different
perspective, for this proposition. Further analysis will be needed, but
the initial European data, embraced in the new procurement directive,
suggest that more flexible procurements with negotiations ultimately
© 2015 Thomson Reuters
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may deliver better value and enhanced competition in international
procurement markets.
Table 5: EU public procurement covered in the dataset by type of procedure (2008-2012)
Number of awards per year

Award value (€ millions)
per year

Total

Crossborder

Share

Total

Crossborder

Share

602

17

2.8%

629

34

5.4%

1,957

48

2.5%

2,399

124

5.2%

6,067

69

1.1%

1,990

50

2.5%

411

17

4.0%

5,289

115

2.2%

8,429

286

3.4%

19,106

1,275

6.7%

8,400

415

4.9%

8,544

743

8.7%

Open procedure

207,651

2,327

1.1%

114,155

3,343

2.9%

Restricted procedure

10,272

203

2.0%

29,100

977

3.4%

Procurement procedure
Accelerated negotiated
procedure
Accelerated restricted
procedure
Award without
publication
Competitive dialogue
Negotiated procedure
with competition
Negotiated procedure
without competition

Source: TED, own calculations

Figure 1: Determinants of Cross-Border Trade, supra, Table 5. Chart
2.2 REGIONAL AND SECTORAL OVERVIEW
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in terms ofBusiness
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of crossand
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and
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Under
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Directive,
2014
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Rev.
112,
123
(“Although
art.
57
Malta (41%), Cyprus (17%) and Luxemburg (16%), compared to an average of 3.7%
leaves
several
questions
unanswered,
it
must
be
regarded
as
a
significant
for the EU as a whole. These descriptive statistics at the Member State level could be
step
a greater
harmonisation
the as
public
procurement
in the
a firsttowards
indication
of the fact
that variablesofsuch
population
might belaw
inversely
EU.”); Rhodri Williams, Anti-Corruption Measures in the EU as They Affect
Public Procurement, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA95 (discussing studies of cor8
ruption in the European Union leading up to new directive).

1. Grounds for Exclusion
Article 57 of the new directive sets forth a number of mandatory
grounds for exclusion for corruption, including:
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•

Participation in a criminal organization;

•

Corruption under the national laws of the contracting authority or the vendor, including potentially corruption under other
nations’ laws, see Hans-Joachim Priess, supra, at 115 (“Therefore, in case the economic operator has its seat of business
outside the EU, the local definition of corruption must also be
considered. Hence, a conviction for corruption by a court of the
country—even one outside the EU or EEA area—where the
economic operator is located may arguably also constitute a
ground for exclusion.”);

•

Fraud -- though only with regard to “fraud affecting the European Communities’ financial interests,” as defined by Article
1 of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests;

•

Terrorist offenses;

•

Money laundering or terrorist financing; and,

•

Child labor and other forms of human trafficking.

Article 57 also calls for mandatory exclusion where, among other
things, the procuring authority knows that the vendor has not paid its
taxes or its social security obligations. Member states may override a
mandatory exclusion on any of these grounds on an exceptional basis, for
“reasons relating to the public interest such as public health or protection
of the environment.” Member states also may derogate from a mandatory
exclusion for failure to pay taxes or social security obligations, if “exclusion
would be clearly disproportionate.” Article 57 further says that member
states may exclude vendors on a number of grounds, including “where the
economic operator has shown significant or persistent deficiencies in the
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract”
-- and important step forward in allowing European procuring agencies
to address past failures in contractor performance. See Hans-Joachim
Priess, supra, at 120-21 (discussing exclusions and exceptions in detail);
Hans-Joachim Priess, Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges in
Procurement Markets Abroad, 2013 Gov. Con. Year Rev. Br. 5 (discussing
draft directive in context of international anti-corruption efforts).
2. Corruption Risks the New European Directive Does
Not Address
From a U.S. perspective, none of this seems surprising. European
Article 57’s grounds for exclusion accord with a U.S. contracting officer’s
broad discretion to exclude “non-responsible” vendors, per FAR Subpart 9.1,
and with U.S. suspension and debarment officials’ sweeping authority to
exclude vendors, government-wide, for any “cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of the contractor or
subcontractor.” FAR 9.406-2(c). What is surprising to those familiar with
the U.S. federal system, however, is what is missing from Article 57 of the
new European directive:
•
© 2015 Thomson Reuters
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done on a contract-by-contract basis, by contracting officials who
may (or may not) have expertise in the grounds for exclusion;
a contracting official may not, for example, know how to judge
whether a vendor truly owes social security taxes. In the United
States, this problem -- contracting officials’ lack of expertise
in the grounds for exclusion -- is what helped undo the Clinton administration’s efforts to use U.S. contracting officers to
“blacklist” vendors for certain types of labor and environmental
violations. See, e.g., Bush Administration Suspends “Blacklisting” Rule, OFCCP Federal Contract Compliance Manual, Letter
No. 226, 2001 WL 36651498 (CCH May 30, 2001).
•

Exclusion as Calibrated Punishment: Rather than using
exclusion as a means of addressing the peculiar reputational
and performance risks that wayward contractors may pose, as
the U.S. system does, see, e.g., Joseph D. West, Timothy J. Hatch,
Christyne K. Brennan & Lawrence J.C. Van Dyke, Suspension
& Debarment, 06-9 Briefing Papers 1, 6-7 (Aug. 2006); Steven A.
Shaw, Mike Wagner & Robert Nichols, Contractor Responsibility: Toward An Integrated Approach To Legal Risk Management,
13-4 Briefing Papers 1 (Mar. 2013), Article 57 seems to contemplate a graduated system of punishment, with mandatory
exclusion reserved for the most serious offenses. This approach,
much like the World Bank’s graduated approach to sanctions,
see World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines, available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/
WorldBankSanctioningGuidelines.pdf, treats exclusion as a
form of graduated punishment, rather than risk mitigation. See,
e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Rethinking the World Bank’s Sanctions System, 55 GC. ¶ 355 (Nov. 2013). The U.S. approach is far
more flexible, and leaves it to contracting officers (on individual
procurements) and suspension and debarment officials (agencyand government-wide) to assess and address contractor-specific
risk, both to prospective projects (performance risk) and to the
government’s legitimacy (reputation risk).

•

Directive Does Not Tackle Fraud: Although, for example, a
2011 study commissioned by the European Commission specifically called for, at the EU level, “better monitoring, detection,
analysis, and reporting technology to fight fraud and corruption,” and to “make these available to Member States,” see PwC
EU Services, Public Procurement: Costs We Pay for Corruption
-- Identifying and Reducing Corruption in Public Procurement in the EU, at 12 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
anti_fraud/documents/anti-fraud-policy/research-and-studies/
pwc_olaf_study_en.pdf, the new European directive does not
offer an integrated solution to address fraud in contract performance.
3. New Directive -- On Contractor Compliance

What will perhaps be most surprising to U.S. observers is the very
limited approach taken to contractor compliance, under the new direc-
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tive. While U.S. procurement law, building on a robust framework of U.S.
compliance rules, generally assumes that contractor compliance systems
will always be used, see, e.g., FAR 52.203-13, the new directive assumes
that “self-cleaning” (compliance) measures will be put in place only after
a contractor engages in misconduct. See Directive 2014/24/EU, Art. 57(6)
(“Any [specifically affected] economic operator . . . may provide evidence
to the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient
to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of a relevant ground
for exclusion.”).
The European directive’s limited approach, which treats compliance
efforts as remedial measures rather than as ongoing risk mitigation
measures, is especially surprising in light of the UK Ministry of Justice
guidelines under the UK Bribery Act of 2010. The United Kingdom’s approach, which follows a worldwide trend, see, e.g., Hans-Joachim Priess,
Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges in Procurement Markets
Abroad, supra, is to require that anti-corruption compliance measures be
put in place by all firms -- not only those that have engaged in misconduct. See UK Ministry of Justice, UK Bribery Act 2010 -- Guidance, at 7
(Mar. 2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/181762/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. The
disconnect between emerging international best practices in compliance
and the new directive suggests that, over time, the European compliance
requirements for contractors may expand, to conform more closely to
international norms.
4. New Challenge: Labor Compliance
For compliance officers on both sides of the Atlantic, perhaps the most
notable new area of compliance concern is labor compliance. The new European directive makes labor violations a potential basis for exclusion, as
does an executive order issued by President Barack Obama in July 2014.
The new European directive provides, in Recital 39, that:
It should . . . be possible to include clauses ensuring compliance
with collective agreements in compliance with Union law in
public contracts. Non-compliance with the relevant obligations
could be considered to be grave misconduct on the part of the
economic operator concerned, liable to exclusion of that economic
operator from the procedure for the award of a public contract

(Emphasis added.) Article 57(4)(c) goes on to say that a contractor may
be excluded “where the contracting authority can demonstrate by appropriate means that the economic operator is guilty of grave professional
misconduct, which renders its integrity questionable.” Although Recital 39
(as noted) is not legally binding, the recital is likely to be read in conjunction with Article 18(2), which calls for member states to “take appropriate
measures to ensure that in the performance of public contracts economic
operators comply with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental,
social and labour law established by Union law, national law, collective
agreements or by the international environmental, social and labour law
provisions.” If a contractor is badly out of step with collective bargain© 2015 Thomson Reuters
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ing agreements, or otherwise engages in serious violations of labor law,
stakeholders -- including unions -- may argue that the contractor should
be excluded under the new directive. See, e.g., European Trade Union
Confederation, New EU Framework on Public Procurement: ETUC Key
Points for the Transposition of Directive 2014/24/EU, at 9 (trade union
confederation discussing labor protections gained under new directive),
available at http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/publication/files/
ces-brochure_transpo_edited_03.pdf.
The Obama administration took a similar approach in the President’s
“Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces” executive order, which was issued on
July 31, 2014. Under that executive order, a contractor could be subject
to exclusion if a contracting official, in consultation with a “labor compliance official,” concluded that the contractor engaged in violations (“particularly serious, repeated, willful, or pervasive violations”) of certain
labor laws. E.O. 13673, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/07/31/executive-order-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces. Although
the executive order remains to be implemented in regulation, the order
has stirred a storm of controversy because it could force a contracting
officer to sit, in practical terms, as a judge of labor violations -- an area
in which contracting officers are not necessarily experienced. See, e.g.,
Executive Order Targets Contractor Compliance With Labor Laws, 56 GC
¶ 266 (Aug. 13, 2014); Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order—
New Rules Require Federal Contractors And Subcontractors To Track And
Report Labor Violations, 38 Constr. Contr. L. Rep. NL 14 (Sept. 12, 2014).
III. TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLICATIONS: E-PROCUREMENT
As the discussion above reflects, the new European directive carries
important practical ramifications for firms that hope to compete in the
European public procurement markets. Here, we review how the new
directive also may affect the United States’ ongoing trade negotiations
with the European Union.
The United States and the European Union are engaged in protracted
negotiations regarding the proposed Transatlantic Trade & Investment
Partnership (TTIP), which would liberalize trade and establish an ongoing system to harmonize regulatory schemes between the United States
and Europe, so as to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. See, e.g., Allen B.
Green & Marques O. Peterson, Converging Procurement Systems -- Part
II: International Trade and Public Procurement 2013 Update, 2014 Gov’t
Cont. Year Rev. Br. 2 (Feb. 2014). Procurement remains an important point
of discussion in those TTIP negotiations. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins
& Hans-Joachim Priess, Feature Comment: Breaking The Impasse In The
Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations:
Rethinking Priorities In Procurement, 56 GC ¶ 235 (July 24, 2014).
Any TTIP agreement between the European Union and the United
States may well address a recurring issue in opening procurement markets: transparency, importantly including transparency as to procurement
opportunities. In addressing this and other elements of open procurement
markets, the TTIP negotiations may be influenced by the Canada - Eu-
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ropean Union Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA),
which is currently being finalized. See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, Major
Procurement Gains in Canada-EU Agreement (Nov. 1, 2013), available
at http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=78. Under CETA, Canada has assured the
European Union that Canadian procurement opportunities at both the
central and sub-central levels (i.e., federal and provincial) will be accessible
through a “single point of entry.” See CETA (provisional text), Chapter X,
Art. VI (“All the notices of intended procurement shall be directly accessible [by electronic means free of charge through a single point of access .
. .”), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/21.aspx?lang=eng.
Although the U.S. federal government already uses a “governmentwide
point of entry,” www.fedbizopps.gov, to publicize federal opportunities on a
centralized website, see, e.g., FAR 5.003, in the United States sub-central
(e.g., state) opportunities do not appear on that site. Many states’ procurement-related websites are available through the National Institute for
Government Procurement (NIGP), http://www.nigp.org/eweb/StartPage.
aspx?Site=NIGP&webcode=gs_stateproclinks, but opportunities on state
websites are not channeled through a central site -- as Canada has promised to do for the European Union. Given Canada’s willingness to establish
a consolidated site (over a five-year transitional period, see CETA, Ch. X,
Art. VI(1) & Annex X-02), and the European Union’s stated goal, in the
new directive, to transition completely to electronic procurement in the
coming years, see Roger Bickerstaff, E-Procurement Under the New EU
Procurement Directives, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 134, the European Union
may argue that the United States, too, should agree in TTIP to make
its procurement opportunities (both “central” and “sub-central”) readily
available on a single website.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new European procurement directives, which are currently being
transposed into member states’ procurement laws, share many common
features with U.S. procurement law. European policymakers are increasingly willing to allow flexible forms of negotiated procurement, similar
to competitive negotiations in the United States, and the European anticorruption measures under the new directive are similar in many ways
to their U.S. counterparts. There remain, however, significant differences
between the two systems -- such as differences in contractor compliance
requirements, and in publicizing procurement opportunities -- which need
to be addressed if harmonization is to help erase unnecessary barriers to
trade between the U.S. and European procurement markets.
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